VERIFY

Verify

The honest version of the privacy claim — what we keep, how your keys are custodied, and how much of the OS you can read today. We can't decrypt content we never hold the keys to; here's the detail, and how to check it yourself.

  • YOUR PLAINTEXT CONTENT

    nowhere never holds it

  • KEYS

    Derived from your passphrase on the device, per device

  • USAGE ↔ PAYMENT

    Designed not to exist (blind tokens)

  • RECOVERY

    Only your 12-word recovery code

RECORDS

What nowhere keeps

We do keep ordinary operational records — here's exactly what, and what we never hold.

DataWhereKept for
Waitlist: the phone you picked from the listA count per phone — no email address, IP address or timeUntil the waitlist ends
Billing & paymentIdentified side + processorAs required for tax / accounting
Support ticketsIdentified side
Store objectsEncrypted, content-addressed in the networkWhile a plan or the free tier covers them. After a plan ends: held 30 days (90 after a 12-month plan). Free storage: cleared after 90 days unused.
Store metadata (sizes, refs, timestamps)Gateway ledger
Your plaintext contentnowhere never holds it—
Usage ↔ payment linkDesigned not to exist (blind tokens)—

KEYS

Key custody

Your keys are derived from your passphrase on the device, per device. They live only in the running session's memory — nowhere never receives them — so powering off erases them. A session you did not log off can stay on the handset, encrypted, until the next boot erases it. The tokens you spend to keep data alive are blind-signed, so the gateway can't link your usage to your payment.

If you forget your passphrase

Only your 12-word recovery code can save your data. We can't — there is no master key and no reset.

WHAT ROAMS

Which apps and data roam, what stays bound to one phone, and what happens to your number

what roams, and what doesn't

SOURCE

Read the code — and verify the build

Not all of it is published yet. endospore’s source is on GitHub under Apache-2.0, published with each release since 0.5.53. The web installer checks each release image against a signed manifest before it flashes it.

For the whole picture — components and trust boundaries, the key model, an adversary → what-they-get table, and an honest list of what nowhere does not defend — read the architecture & threat model, published with the source.